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Abstract. We present the proposed security architecture Deutsche Bahn
plans to deploy to protect its trackside safety-critical signalling system
against cyber-attacks. We first present the existing reference interlocking
system that is built using standard components. Next, we present a tax-
onomy to help model the attack vectors relevant for the railway environ-
ment. Building upon this, we present the proposed “compartmentalized”
defence concept for securing the upcoming signalling systems.
1 Introduction
The state of the art in safety-critical railway signalling typically entails the
use of monolithic interlocking systems that are often proprietary, expensive and
not easily exchangeable. Consequently, the transition to more cost-effective and
growth-oriented open networks is desired that can also utilize commercial off-
the-shelf (COTS) hardware and software, provided the safety requirements are
met.
These drivers have led Deutsche Bahn (DB) to explore transforming its sig-
nalling infrastructure using open networks and COTS to reduce cost and mainte-
nance overhead. At the same time, the risk of cyber-attacks introduced by open
networks and COTS needs to be explicitly addressed to avoid any compromise
of safety. This work documents DB’s ongoing experience in developing new sig-
nalling architectures that by-design decouple safety and security functionalities.
In this context, we first present a taxonomy of attacks outlining the potential
cyber-threats relevant to protecting a railway signalling system. Consequently,
utilizing the actual layout of the currently used German railway command and
control system, we propose a security architecture that explicitly delineates
safety and security, and will be deployed by DB in Germany’s new interlocking
systems (ILS) to address security concerns. The architecture is compartmental-
ized into zones and conduits following IEC 62443 [6]. Thereby we regard the
German prestandard DIN VDE V 0831-104 [2] which is a guideline to apply
IEC 62443 to the railway signalling domain with respect to the very strict safety
requirements.
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Fig. 1. Architecture of a typical signalling network.
2 Current Interlocking Network Architecture
The reference architecture, as currently deployed by DB, is divided into three
layers: Operational Layer, Interlocking Layer and the Field Element Area.
The Operational Layer (upper blocks of Fig. 1) consists of an Operating Cen-
ter and a Security Center. The Operating Center is responsible for the central
monitoring and controlling of the system and is equipped with central switch-
ing points. The Security Center provides security services to the system such
as security monitoring of certain communication channels and management of
the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). As depicted in Fig. 1, the communication
between the Operational Layer and the Interlocking Layer of the reference ar-
chitecture is encrypted. The Security Center has the same or higher security
requirements compared to the rest of the components.
The Interlocking Layer (middle blocks in Fig. 1) provides the safety logic of
the system. The main components of the Interlocking Layer are the Technology
Center and the interface to the European Train Control System (ETCS), as
depicted in Fig. 1. The Technology Center is comprised of the ILS and auxiliary
systems (e.g., needed for documenting the actions of the ILS). The ILS plays
a central role in the reference architecture by ensuring system’s safety given
its critical role to control signals, switches and to prevent any conflicting train
movements.
The Field Element Area (FEA) (lowest blocks in Fig. 1) provides the interface
to the actual trackside signalling elements called field elements. These are signals,
points, and train detection systems amongst others that are steered by Object
Controllers (OC).
Communication across the components of the Operational and Interlocking
layers takes place over a Wide Area Network (WAN) through the use of Stan-
dard Communication Interfaces. Typically, the Rail Safe Transport Application
(RaSTA) Protocol [3] is used as a unified communication protocol for all the
defined interfaces. RaSTA targets at guaranteeing safety in the communication
of railway systems. Each RaSTA-network is assigned a network identification
number which is unique within the given transport layer. A safety code is used
to guarantee the integrity of the transmitted messages. Required redundancy for
the system’s high availability is omitted in Fig. 1 to reduce complexity.
As can be seen in Fig. 1, only the communication between the Operational
and Interlocking Layers of the reference architecture is encrypted. This is in-
sufficient from a security perspective, and naturally the entire communication
chain across the Technology Center, the FEAs and the linking communication
interfaces need to be protected. However, enhancing the presented architecture
in terms of security is not a trivial task, as various operational and compatibility
constraints make introducing innovations to the interlocking system rather cum-
bersome. A complicating factor being re-ensuring that no safety violations get
introduced with any security related changes (i.e. proving freedom of interfer-
ence). In a normal computational environment, addressing security issues might
require rapid patching and frequent updates. However, for the safety-critical rail-
way environment any changes to a critical infrastructure, such as the signalling
system that might affect the safety of the system, require explicit approval by the
National Safety Authority. This can take significant time and exacerbates the
timely reaction to security risks. In addition, the limited hardware resources in
the signalling system do not allow deploying widely-used security solutions that
are computationally intensive. Moreover, it is expected that deployed systems
are used over a long operational lifetime (typically decades) and also provide
strong timeliness response guarantees. All of these constraints need to be explic-
itly addressed when proposing a security-oriented signalling system architecture.
3 Railway Security Assessment
In order to propose a security architecture, this section presents the prerequisites
needed for defending signalling infrastructure and also elucidates the capabili-
ties of attackers against which the signalling system needs to be protected. To
systematically tackle the problem of enhancing security in interlocking systems,
we first provide a taxonomy of the attacks relevant for the railway environment.
Given the physically large spatial scattering of the railway infrastructure, it
is infeasible to install physical protection comparable to a limited area factory
premise. Access control and plant security, as important elements in a factory’s
security concept, do not apply to the full extent across the railway system. Only
some parts – for example the interlocking computer – reside in a building that
offers physical perimeter protection, while others (e.g., the field elements) lie
unprotected along the railtracks.
In addition, we need to ensure safety and high availability of railway signalling
systems. This is tightly coupled with the timeliness requirements of critical com-
munication between network entities. In cases where we cannot preclude attacks,
it is necessary to install monitoring systems that can detect ongoing attacks. For
setting up a proper security concept we first need to define the capabilities of the
attacker we want to defend the system against. In the railway signalling com-
munity it is widely recognized that some security incidents are already covered
by the established safety functions.
The design of DB’s security architecture follows the standard IEC 62443 [6]
and the German prestandard DIN VDE V 0831-104 [2]. They classify the strength
of attackers according to their (financial) resources, their motivation, and their
knowledge. With the attacker strength in mind, we capture attacks that can be
performed in a taxonomy that scopes the applicable security measures.
A taxonomy can facilitate enhancing security, as it can represent the diverse
attack scenarios that threaten the railway signalling system, and also allows to
consider future threats. While sophisticated attack scenarios have been consid-
ered by the taxonomies in [4, 5, 7–9] as well, most of them go beyond attack
vectors and include information on the targeted system [4,8] that can be as de-
tailed as software versions. However, unlike contemporary taxonomies built on
full information access, we consider the systems from the operator perspective
and do not know beforehand which technology the vendors use to meet the re-
quirements. Thus, we are constrained to only model generic requirements of the
systems.
Figure 2 outlines our approach to categorize threats. On the top level we dis-
tinguish across directed and undirected attacks. This is justified by the following
assumption: It is impossible for undirected attacks to cause an unsafe state in
the signalling system, as they will typically not circumvent the existing safety
measures. However, this class of attacks may affect the availability of the system.
Since casualties could be the consequence, we consider impersonation as the
most severe attack (i.e. an attacker being able to forge authentic messages of a
network entity such as a OC or the ILS computer itself). As in any other net-
work that comprises standard components, all known and unknown vulnerabili-
ties pose a threat to the system in case they are exploited. Thus, vulnerabilities
must be regarded in an attack model. Due to the scattered physical layout of
the network it is prone to many kinds of information gathering attempts, and
network entities like the field elements are difficult to protect against physical
tampering. Although confidentiality is not an important target of signalling se-
curity, some information like cryptographic keys that are used to protect entities
Fig. 2. A Railway Attack Taxonomy.
and communication channels, as well as account credentials, need to be kept se-
cret. A compromised key would enable more severe attacks on the system, for
example impersonation. This interconnection shows that a holistic approach is
needed to secure railway signalling and neither perimeter protection nor isolated
solutions will suffice. Orthogonal to the presented threats are denial-of-service
attacks where no comprehensive countermeasure exists. The signalling systems
mitigate this threat by utilizing redundancy and avoiding single points of fail-
ure. We do not explicitly depict redundancy in Fig. 1 and 3, though all signalling
relevant communication is performed over at least two separate channels pro-
vided by RaSTA. Entities such as the Security Center (from Fig. 1) also exist
redundantly.
4 New Security Architecture for Interlocking Systems
For safety-related railway systems, the dominant requirements are integrity,
timely delivery of critical messages and system availability. To ensure this, a
Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, and Safety (RAMS) lifecycle has been
introduced by EN 50126 [1] to make the current signalling systems resilient to
internal faults and human error. However, EN 50126 does not consider attackers
or malware that constitute a growing threat to all industrial control systems,
including railway signalling systems. Thus, enhanced security mechanisms are
needed, provided their potential to detrimentally affect safety and availability
is explicitly delineated. This makes it infeasible to introduce standard “commer-
cial” anti-malware and anti-virus systems into an ILS network, as the side effects
are not easily discernible to be controlled.
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Fig. 3. Proposed Security Architecture for interlocking systems of DB.
Based on the developed attack model taxonomy, a security architecture for
the new interlocking technology was engineered. The security engineering pro-
cess is based on the standard IEC 62443-3-3 [6] with guidance taken from DIN
VDE V 0831-104 [2]. According to the general system design the signalling sys-
tem has been partitioned into functional blocks e.g., Object Controllers (OC)
and ILS (see Fig. 3). The reference architecture is additionally divided into zones
and conduits, where each zone is logically or physically defined [6]. According to
IEC 62443 each object within the architecture being hardware, software, user,
etc. is assigned to exactly one zone or to exactly one conduit. A zone (colored
areas) is a grouping of assets that have common security requirements which is
expressed as a Security Level (SL) that is assigned to each zone. Conduits are
the communication channels between zones with both the same and different
security requirements.
A risk analysis yielded SLs of 2 or 3 for every zone. Based on these SLs,
the security requirements were defined for every component of the system to
ensure the fulfilment of a defence-in-depth concept. The requirements range from
password changing abilities over cryptographic functions to a set of requirements
that support the later detection and analysis of attacks e.g., logging capabilities.
After the zones have been provided with security measures, the conduits
between them remain a vulnerable point. In contrast to the zones, IEC 62443-3-3
does not contain guidance on how to secure conduits. Over our requirements
and taxonomy process two types of conduits have been identified, namely: (a)
conduits connecting zones of equal SL, and (b) conduits connecting zones of
different SLs. Conduits which only have unidirectional data flow could also be
considered, but these are only a subtype of one of the former described conduits.
The system layout of Fig. 1 has been extended to secure the zones and con-
duits, as shown in Fig. 3. Again, redundancy is omitted. The FEA is provided
in more detail to show the security application. Multiple OCs are presented as
there are a number of field elements to steer in a single FEA. For redundancy,
they are organized in a ring topology with switches (angular boxes) and routers
(round boxes). The relation between OC and field element is usually one-to-one.
Security boxes have been added to every OC (depicted as locks) in the FEA
within a junction box (labelled FeAk). They provide the system with encryption
capabilities and the possibility for basic filtering and DoS prevention rules. The
capabilities are required for securing conduits between zones with equal SLs.
The boxes are based on a ruggedized and hardened hardware platform. As they
are completely separated from the safety functionality, they can be applied as
a replacement of switch components in the interlocking network and even be
introduced during system upgrades. The security terminates in the security box,
thus the safety hardware need to be protected by physical measures. The FEA
junction boxes are thus physically protected by “housing alerts” that trigger an
alarm to prohibit attackers from tampering with the system.
In the Technology Center, a termination point for the field element encryption
has been introduced. Also, several zones with different SLs have to be connected,
e.g., the interlocking system has to be connected to the maintenance and data
management subsystem (MDM) with different SL.
To tackle this challenge, an application layer gateway (ALG) has been intro-
duced as a central entity of the Technology Center. This device is configured to
only allow desired connections between zones. Via packet inspection mechanisms
malicious code can be identified. If zones of different SL are connected, the al-
lowed communication can be limited via white-list filtering on different layers. If
anomalous behaviour is detected the ALG reports this to the Security Operation
Center (SOC), where an operator can decide what actions have to be taken. In
certain cases the separation of a zone from the rest of the network (quarantine)
may be needed, which then can be realized by the ALG. Upon the detection of
new attack scenarios the operator also has the possibility to change the rule set
and filtering of the ALG to mitigate the new attack.
On the operational layer the SOC has been extended by a Security and Infor-
mation Event Management (SIEM) system besides elements for system manage-
ment, such as PKI, domain name service, network time server, and a directory
service. The SIEM system aggregates information from every component and
analyses it for possible attacks. If it detects a possible attack the security op-
erator is informed, starts with further investigation on the issue, and finally
performs some action to solve it.
As the provisioning of security requires the application of tools and meth-
ods on a sustained basis, a process based approach is implemented to ensure a
constant level of security. For this a patch management process has been devel-
oped. Changes to components are first checked in a simulated environment for
quality assurance before they are applied to the operational components. For a
rapid reaction to attacks, the rule sets of the ALG and security boxes can be
altered to mitigate the vulnerability until a patch can be applied. Furthermore,
processes for incident management and an Information Security Management
System (ISMS) have been implemented. Upon the detection of an anomaly it is
checked against a database of known incidents and relevant actions are applied.
For unclassified anomalies, forensics are performed to determine the relevant re-
action. After solving the incident, the findings are used as input for the ISMS to
enhance the security processes.
By having added security features to the communication channel of the safety
building blocks, the architecture allows to control that strict safety requirements
such as availability and timeliness are still met. The communication channel is
transparent to the safety system such that the security blocks can be updated
independently and without affecting the safety homologation process. The de-
coupling of safety and security still requires to make the physical gap between
them as small as possible (e.g., on the same circuit board), to avoid attacks just
behind the security component.
5 Conclusion
The existing interlocking architecture provides insufficient security against cyber-
attacks. To overcome this, DB plans to deploy the presented security architecture
in Germany’s new ILS to mitigate security risks without detrimentally impact-
ing the system’s safety. The presented security concept includes monitoring and
information systems as well as basic security building blocks such as cryptogra-
phy support and filtering. It ensures security not only cross the Operational and
Interlocking layers but also provides security functions for the Technology Cen-
ter and the Field Element Areas. In addition, processes are established to ensure
the correct handling of incidents and functional requirements to each building
block in order to help build security enabled components.
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